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The American Jury Project and the Chicago Law School
by Franklin E. Zimring*
The hundred year history of this law school splits into two almost
equal chronological segments, with the great divide taking place in
1950 when President Hutchins appointed Edward Hirsch Levi to
become its dean. Levi was a graduate of both the college and the Law
School of the University of Chicago, the first home-grown dean and
the only one until Geoff Stone in the 1980s. Two striking features of
the early years of Edward Levi’s deanship provide important perspectives on the school’s development. The first is that the Levi deanship was part of a much broader demographic shift in leadership at
Chicago. No fewer than four Chicago Law graduates from the period
1935-1941 joined (in Levi’s case rejoined) the faculty after World
War II and stayed on—Levi, Bernard Meltzer, Harry Kalven and
Walter Blum—and the collective impact of this group on the trajectory of the Chicago Law School over the next 35 years was enormous. For those who attended the school during its second half-century, it would be difficult to imagine the institution without each of
these four as a defining element in its character.
The second allegation I make without fear of contradiction is that
the 12 years Edward Levi served as dean at Chicago marked its clear
transformation from a very good school into a great one. Frank
Ellsworth makes a persuasive case that Chicago was a very strong
school the day it opened (Ellsworth 1977). But nothing happening in
Hyde Park struck terror in the faculty lounge at Harvard Law School
until late in the Edward Levi deanship. By the mid-1960s, the Law
School on 60th Street was an intellectual power of the first rank and
has remained so ever since.
* William G. Simon Professor of Law and Chair of the Criminal Justice Research
Program at the University of California, Berkeley. I thank Shari Diamond, Owen
Fiss, Jack Schlegel, and Jan Vetter for comments on an earlier draft of this lecture. Much of my knowledge of the project came from interviews in 1991 and
1992 with Walter Blum, Edward Levi, Bernard Meltzer and Fred Strodtbeck.
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The tactics that Levi and company used to build both the institution’s capacity and its reputation were a mix of the standard and the
rather unconventional. The standard method of institution building in
the law school world is mid-career theft, hiring away leading faculty
from other prominent centers of learning. Chicago did much of this
in the early 1950s. Karl Llewelyn and Soia Mentschikoff came
together in 1951, the same year that the young Allison Dunham
arrived. Francis Allen was recruited twice. Not all the lateral entry
hiring was the conventional search for leading lights. There was a
risk-taker’s preference for eccentric greatness in the profile of established scholars that Chicago recruited. The husband and wife team of
Llewelyn and Mentschikoff provided glamour to be sure, but what of
the contentious and non-establishment Kenneth Culp Davis, who had
made surprisingly few friends while providing a distinctive jurisprudential structure for American administrative law? This was not an
appointment made to generate envy at Harvard or Columbia. But the
lesson here may be that greatness justified taking risks.
The effort to build a research program in law and the behavioral
sciences was a major theme in planning from very early in Edward
Levi’s decanal career, in large part because Robert Hutchins had
reported substantial interest in support for such work from meetings
he had with senior Ford Foundation staff.
Hutchins had preached the gospel of social science research into
legal issues early in his youthful deanship of the Yale Law School in
the late 1920s. William O. Douglas and Charles Clark had launched
projects gathering data on case flow and bankruptcy (Schlegel 1993).
After Hutchins left Yale, Professor Underhill Moore did embark on
an ambitious law and behavioral science project that tried to generalize from observations about the impact of parking signs on the behavior of automobile operators. The Yale program was not considered a
success either in the legal academy or in the behavioral sciences
(Schlegel 1993). In that respect it is typical of the reputation of other
efforts at Johns Hopkins and Columbia.
But the strong interest in law and the social sciences continued
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despite the notable absence of proven examples of valuable interdisciplinary work. By 1950, Robert Hutchins had emerged as a major
influence at the Ford Foundation, an institution he would move to in
1951 and which would support Hutchins and his agenda for the
remaining quarter-century of his life. So the strong interest of Ford in
a program of law and behavioral science research was money in the
bank, a guarantee of substantial funding for any credible research
program that the law school might create. This was viewed as a substantial institution-building opportunity for Edward Levi and the
post-war Young Turks at Chicago.
But what topics should be the central concerns for a research program and how might they be studied by an interdisciplinary team
based in an American law school? The task of identifying topics and
methods was a challenging one. And while the future projects were
to be interdisciplinary collaborations, the identification of topics and
the organization of a research effort was not interdisciplinary. It was
an inside job, the work of a collection of young law professors at a
small Midwestern school with little or no formal training in empirical methods. Three topics were identified by the informal planning
group as the basis for sustained research programs—the jury, the
arbitration process, and citizen perceptions of fairness in taxation.
Two other candidates for study early in the process—the youthful
offender and obscenity—had dropped out by 1953. The tax topic was
an outgrowth of the interests of Harry Kalven and Walter Blum in the
jurisprudence of fair taxation. They were collaborating in a short
book-length project published as The Uneasy Case for Progressive
Taxation (1953). A research project on tax would attempt to probe the
linkage between public sentiments and various aspects of tax policy.
Arbitration was the most formally structured and commercially
prominent system of private dispute resolution to serve as an alternative to litigation in courts in commercial and labor management relationships. It was also a serious interest of Soia Mentschikoff, who
was the first and last director of the arbitration project at Chicago.
The jury was widely regarded as a prime candidate for empirical
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study. The jury was a distinctive and controversial part of the AngloAmerican legal system that had been the subject of endless speculation—particularly in the law of evidence—but virtually no empirical
study. While it was the least eccentric of the three research topics put
forward in the proposal to Ford, it was also the one topic without an
obvious principal investigator on the Chicago faculty. Bernard
Meltzer took the lead in identifying the jury as a priority project and
chairing the faculty committee assembled to create a research strategy for the jury study (Meltzer 1953). But his contributions to the jury
enterprise were more in the spirit of pro bono public service than a
bid by Meltzer to start a long career of collaborative empirical
research. So this centrally important research program had three different faculty directors in its first two years—Bernard Meltzer, the
founder; Phil Kurland, who joined the faculty as the jury project was
taking shape, and who would soon make his primary institutional
contribution at Chicago by founding and building the Supreme Court
Review; and finally, Harry Kalven, Jr. By 1953, the law and behavioral science project had a Ford grant of $400,000 (it would eventually cost about $1,000,000) and an urgent need to launch. And
Edward Levi had taken personal responsibility for the jury project in
his reporting to Ford (Levi 1953, 1954, 1958).
What took Harry Kalven so long to come to this project was not
any lack of interest on his part in the jury as a legal and governmental institution. Kalven was deeply interested in juries and had a number of creative and original insights about the jury. But Harry Kalven
was interested in everything and had an almost embarrassing fountain
of fresh ideas on any legal topic he would address. He was also committed to the tax project with Walter Blum until his transition to the
jury project marked a quiet and almost costless end to that enterprise.
The major difference between the sort of small-scale “law and”
projects that the tax undertaking and the arbitration project were to
become and the scale as well as wholly original effort that the jury
project would demand at Chicago is ultimately a matter of personnel. The proposal to Ford for all three projects and the longer
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research prospectus on the jury were all law school “inside jobs”
written by law professors acting alone (Levi 1953). But a major factgathering project would require an empirical social scientist with
senior professional status who could center his professional life in a
law school. The only alternative would have been handing responsibility to a social scientist who would settle comfortably into a
department of his disciplinary peers and then commute to the law
school from time to time.
The problem with that commuting approach is simple. Once that
process gets launched, once the social scientist no longer lives in the
law school, the project itself either leaves the law school or the social
scientist becomes less centrally involved in the design and execution
of the research. But what type of senior methodologist would wish
his primary affiliation to be with a law school? And how could the
scholar and the school avoid pushing a professional social scientist to
the periphery of the law school’s social and intellectual circles?
These problems are critical to the prospects for empirical research
in law schools, then and now. To solve them, Edward Levi was hunting for Hans Zeisel, but he didn’t know it yet. One of Levi’s early
stops was to offer the jury project job to Paul Lazarsfeld of Columbia
University’s Bureau of Applied Social Science. After turning Dean
Levi down, Professor Lazarsfeld suggested that his friend and former
colleague Hans Zeisel might be perfect for the task. Lazarsfeld and
Zeisel had collaborated in Austria on a study of Marienthal published
in the early 1930s, before both became refugees from Hitler’s
Europe. Zeisel had both a law degree and experience pioneering market research in Europe. He had found his primary professional success as a market researcher in the United States, first with the Tea
Council, later as head of a research effort for the Interpublic advertising empire of Marion Harper. But Zeisel had also maintained academic connections and ambitions during the first decade of his
American career. In the mid-1940s he had written a small book called
Say It With Figures that was both a guide to statistical analysis and to
statistical presentation. (The book would go through six editions.)

6

qÜÉ j~ìêáÅÉ ~åÇ jìêáÉä cìäíçå iÉÅíìêÉ pÉêáÉë

Say It With Figures was a prominent display of the ingenuity, originality, and idiosyncratic creativity that are the trademarks of Hans
Zeisel’s work. Edward Levi’s invitation to join the law faculty and
the jury project was accepted with eagerness by Zeisel. Throughout
his long Chicago affiliation Zeisel also maintained his New York professional contacts and identity, which on more than one occasion
served as an economic and emotional safety valve. But for the next
39 years, Hans Zeisel’s intellectual home address was the University
of Chicago Law School.
Zeisel was one of two sociologists brought to Chicago with the
first Ford grant to contribute to the jury research. The other was Fred
Strodtbeck, a young Yale product who settled into Hyde Park but
developed his primary associations in the Department of Sociology
rather than the Law School. He was importantly involved in the jury
simulation work that produced, among other publications, The Jury
and the Defense of Insanity (Simon 1966). Zeisel moved into the Law
School, bonded with Harry Kalven, and began work on the formal
design of the most ambitious empirical data design and collection
effort in the history of fact research in the legal academy.
The first important contribution of Hans Zeisel to the central core
of the jury research was a research design using questionnaires to
contact trial judges who had presided over jury trials to report on
their experiences with the trial and both their personal opinion of the
appropriate verdict in the case and of the verdict of the jury.
Eventually, more than 500 judges would report on more than 3,600
criminal jury trials in the data set reported in The American Jury.
Of course, emphasizing this approach—the central methodology
reported in the 1966 book The American Jury—understates both the
range of the questions the jury project investigated and the methods
that Zeisel, Kalven, Fred Strodtbeck, Rita James Simon, Thomas
Callahan, Dale Broeder, and others used in more than 60 published
reports prior to the 1966 jury volume, as well as several jury studies
published by Zeisel and others in the two decades after The American
Jury appeared. Jury simulations resulted in a number of published
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studies including Rita James Simon’s work on jury responses to different legal standards for the insanity defense. Jurors were the subject
of exit interviews much like those used decades later in election studies. Famously, jury proceedings were recorded in Wichita, Kansas,
with the consent of trial judges but without the knowledge of the jury.
When word of this got out, it resulted in a scandal that produced
angry hearings before a U.S. Senate Subcommittee as well as federal legislation and statutes in more than thirty states prohibiting jurytapping (see Katz 1972). Dean Edward Levi willingly bore the brunt
of the Eastland Committee’s scorn in the hearings to shield both the
project itself and the two principle investigators from further harm.
With all these methodologies and the wide variety of questions
investigated, the use of the questionnaire to judges and the comparison of judicial and jury verdicts in jury trials was the central theme in
the 1966 study of the criminal jury, and that book is the centerpiece
of the jury project. The simple and elegant design Hans Zeisel contributed for this study immediately distinguished the jury project
from the sincere but unstrategic efforts of data collection that were
characteristic of empirical research efforts at American law schools
in the first half of the 20th century. In comparing the judgments of
judges and juries, the study was asking a series of questions about the
central institutional role of the jury—what difference does it make
when juries decide cases rather than judges, in what sorts of cases
does it matter most, and why?
While psychologists and students of small groups might be more
interested in how juries work, and in how different types of members
influence jury outcomes, the basic design of the jury project questionnaire addressed the central difference that the presence of the jury
made to the operation of the legal system. This strategy was put in
place early in the long research period. It seems to me that this
approach made the empirical data from the project into a study of the
impact of a legal institution in the way that none of the other behavioral research projects of earlier years could claim.
In emphasizing its research design, I do not mean to pretend that
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the jury project was a triumph of central planning. A lack of premeditation was obvious in the schedule and the priorities of the project.
The identification of judges who had presided at jury trials and the
analysis of the judge’s accounts of the trial was a central approach,
but resources were expended on a wide variety of other approaches.
Many of the research initiatives did not produce useful findings. The
simulation exercises under the direction of Fred Strodtbeck were not
integrated into the substantive discussion of jury behavior even when
The American Jury was discussing a topic where the simulations had
produced a book, such as the insanity defense (see Kalven and Zeisel
1966, Chapter 25). The initial questionnaire effort in 1954-55 had to
be supplemented with a second wave of sampled judges in 1958.
While some targets of opportunity research were completed fairly
quickly—such as the volume on delay in civil cases—the volume on
the criminal jury was not published until 12 years after the first sample of cases was collected. Without doubt, the progress of this most
expensive single law and behavioral science initiative was trial and
error throughout the 15 years from inception to the publication of its
culminating volume. Was the project as a whole a success?
Over the 15 years that it operated as a formal program at the
University of Chicago, the project produced three books and more
than 20 publications reporting original empirical data. But when
measured up against the project’s announced ambitions, even this
scholarly armada fell considerably short of the mark. The three published volumes were three less than had been planned. The volume on
the criminal jury took twice as long as had been allotted for it, and
the long time in preparation was noted in reviews of The American
Jury (see Friendly 1966). The civil jury volume was never completed. All of this generated some insecurity about the success of the
project 35 years ago, but it seems more than clear in the view from
2003 that the project was a triumph.
When compared to the other efforts to create empirical research
programs in law schools, the jury project was a singular success in
generating important and methodologically sophisticated research on
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questions of basic importance on legal institutions. Where other pioneering efforts spent the majority of their time and treasure gathering
vast quantities of descriptive statistics on case flows in legal institutions, business failures, parking behavior, and traffic flows and only
then attempted to bring some meaning to their data sets, the jury project was design driven in almost all its research soundings. And the
empirical research reported in The American Jury is also legally quite
sophisticated in both its design and interpretation.
When the natural history of previous attempts at large-scale fact
research is consulted, the amazing thing about the jury project is not
that it took 13 years to finish its magnum opus, but rather that the two
principal researchers had the commitment and tenacity to see the jury
project through to its culminating achievement. The jury project went
on after the Ford money had run out, fueled by institutional and personal commitments to finish this job. After a brief description of the
book that Kalven and Zeisel produced, I will try to explain why perseverance overcame the hazards and frustrations that are the
inevitable curse of ambitious law school fact research projects.
The Jury Volume
The central publication of the Chicago jury project was a 500-page
account of the questionnaire-to-judges-based study of criminal jury
trials conducted in the United States during the 1950s. It is both well
written and well organized but can by no means be described as light
reading because of the extraordinary detail of the research report.
After describing the nature and volume of criminal jury trials and the
research methods used in the main questionnaire study, the book first
documents the prevalence of agreements and disagreements between
judge and jury and then examines the patterns found in different areas
of the criminal law, with different characteristics of defendants and
their lawyers, and in different evidentiary settings.
The basic findings of the study are straightforward. As the judges
tell it, judge and jury agree on the verdict in about three-fourths of all
criminal trials. When the judge and the jury disagree, the jury is seven
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times more likely to be more lenient than the judge—either acquitting
the defendant or convicting of a lesser offense—than to find a verdict
that is more severe than the judge would have imposed. Table 12
reproduces one of the two-by-two tables that is the basic method of
data presentation in the volume.
oÉéêçÇìÅíáçå Ñêçã qÜÉ ^ãÉêáÅ~å gìêóI q~ÄäÉ NO
sÉêÇáÅí çÑ gìêó ~åÇ gìÇÖÉμ`çåëçäáÇ~íÉÇ
EmÉêÅÉåí çÑ ~ää PRTS qêá~äëF
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`çåîáÅíë
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qçí~ä gìêó

PP

ST

NMMB

Z gìÇÖÉJgìêó ^ÖêÉÉãÉåí
Even where disagreement takes place, the surrounding circumstances do not show a great gulf between the jury’s verdict and the
judge’s version of a correct legal outcome. Juries are much more likely to reach a verdict contrary to that of the judge when the judge
acknowledges that the evidence is close, and the presiding judge
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infrequently attributes disagreement with his verdict to the jury’s failure to understand the evidence or the law. Cases more likely to produce jury disagreement in a lenient direction are those with a sympathetic defendant, a criminal charge with which the jury is not wholly
in sympathy, and superior defense counsel. Typically it is a combination of these jury equities—such as a close case with a sympathetic
defendant—that best predicts a divergent jury verdict rather than just
one equity factor. But even though the judge and jury are not far
apart, the presence of a jury doubles the acquittal rate from what the
judges would have produced (see Table 12).
The book’s global evaluation of this pattern is the memorable
conclusion “that the jury, despite its autonomy, spins so close to the
legal baseline” (Kalven and Zeisel 1966, p. 498).
“The jury thus represents an uniquely subtle distribution of official power, an unusual arrangement of checks and balances. It represents also an impressive way of building discretion, equity, and flexibility into a legal system. Not the least of the advantages is that the
jury, relieved of the burdens of creating precedent, can bend the law
without breaking it” (ibid).
This last and brilliant summation is more than a testament of the
verbal genius of Harry Kalven, Jr.; it is also a clear demonstration of
how, at nearly every turn in its methodology and analysis, The
American Jury is legal scholarship, combining a deep understanding
of substantive law and procedure with its insights on jury motives
and functions. At every level from the choice of the basic issue to be
investigated to the particular points of analysis in chapters on selfdefense and contributory fault to this concluding tribute to an institution that respects the formal law without being compelled to follow
it, The American Jury was a volume that could only be written as
legal research. When Edward Levi called the jury project “the highest achievement of an approach long advocated but never before
accomplished,” I think he was referring to a quality of The American
Jury that transcended social science to become the applied empirical
jurisprudence of the American realist ambition.
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The Anatomy of Perseverance
The 15-year gestation period of The American Jury invites two linked
questions: Why did it take so long? And how could the project fight
off the frustrations and centrifugal forces that had deconstructed so
many other efforts to generate large-scale empirical legal research.
The authors of the jury volume addressed the long gestation period in
their preface:
“The original program...was to bring together into a
working partnership the lawyer and the social scientist; in a phrase we have often used, the hope was to
marry the research skills and fresh perspectives of the
one to the socially significant problems of the other,
and in the end to produce a new scholarship and literature for both....The venture turned out to be more
ambitious than we originally anticipated. The collection of the data involved new problems of diplomacy
and public relations; the analysis of it was rich in
unexpected impasses; and finally, the writing, the
development of style to blend legal meaning with statistical measurement proved extraordinarily difficult.
In brief, it has taken a long time to get this far”
(Kalven and Zeisel 1966, Preface, p. 1).
For the most part, I think this account was plausible in 1966 and
remains persuasive a generation later.
A Labor of Love
But why did the collaboration at the center of the jury project persist
for the 13 years it took to write the project’s defining book? On a
variety of different levels, what held the jury project together was
love. The project would not have produced the jury volume unless
Hans Zeisel had survived the marginal position of being a social sci-
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entist in a law school for well over a decade. How did this happen? It
helped that Zeisel thought of himself as a lawyer, but there were still
slights both real and imagined that would have tempted this proud
and prickly man to escape what might have seemed like second-class
citizenship and the frustrations also of being a junior partner in writing the volume. Except that Hans Zeisel adored Harry Kalven and
was honored by the gift of his collaboration. For Zeisel, The
American Jury was literally a labor of love. Kalven enjoyed the challenge of finding coherence in empirical data, and he genuinely loved
the jury as an institution, an enthusiasm that was sufficiently contagious to capture Zeisel as well, at least as regards the criminal jury.
There were two other strong bonds that explain the continuing
commitment of Kalven and Zeisel to the criminal jury volume. One
was the promise of the data. The topic that this volume would investigate was central, and the research was much more fundamental than
the other pieces that had been issued by jury project or were scheduled for publication. At least by the early 1960s, the project was energized by the prospect of its potential greatness.
One further loyalty played an important part in the perseverance.
Edward Levi had put his reputation on the line for the jury project in
the 1955 Senate hearings, in his budgetary priorities, and finally in
securing tenure for Hans Zeisel in 1961. One evidence of the strong
bond between Kalven and Levi was Edward Levi’s heartfelt public
memorial to Harry Kalven in 1975, a tribute that ended, “Goodnight,
sweet prince.” Kalven’s loyalty to Edward Levi was unqualified.
Zeisel, too, wanted little more than to justify the risks and confidence
that Levi had put in the venture.
The jury project was not a peripheral part of the program that
Edward Levi had led at Chicago. It was a highly visible gamble on
one research project, a project that would be much mentioned in the
competitive gossip of American law schools, win or lose. The perseverance that produced The American Jury was as much a testament
to the social cohesion of the Hyde Park Mafia as to funding streams
or the organizational chart of the venture. I know of no other place
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and no other time when a major American law school had at its core
truly familial relations and loyalties of this intensity. It will probably
never happen again.
Legacies and Lessons
A generation has passed since the jury volume was published, sufficient time so that we can trace some of its impact on legal scholarship and the lessons it teaches about the promise and limits of empirical research in the legal academy.
One obvious question is whether the empirical study of jurors and
jury behavior that was launched a half century ago has continued.
The business of jury research is booming, and our knowledge of jury
behavior and the methods to study it have improved in every decade
since the jury project launched the enterprise. The majority of modern jury research is done by psychologists, and this has produced
more emphasis on simulation and experiment. But legally informed
research has also flourished, some of the best of it the product of
Hans Zeisel’s later collaborations with Shari Seidman Diamond as
well as Professor Diamond’s more recent work. There is even now a
serious effort afloat to repeat an improved version of The American
Jury research plan. Where legal debates were once embarrassed by a
lack of data about the behavior of juries and jurors, modern courts
may find themselves embarrassed by convincing empirical evidence
about juror attitudes that is inconsistent with the assumptions about
jurors that a court majority wishes to make (see e.g. Ellsworth 1988,
Zeisel 1973). And jury studies have come full circle from the jury
bugging scandal when Shari Diamond and her collaborators recorded Arizona jury discussions with the consent of court and jurors
(Diamond, et al 2003).
But what about the empirical study of law and legal institutions
in American law schools? On this question, the view from 2003 presents a rather mixed picture. On the one hand, the number of law professors with a sophisticated background in social science research
methods has grown explosively over the past three decades. There is
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an electronic law school service devoted to empirical studies of various kinds (Arlen) and the Journal of Legal Studies has been publishing empirical work of many kinds for 30 years. On the other hand,
no law school based research enterprise of the generation just past
has approached the scale of the jury product in human and fiscal
resources, and none is likely to in the foreseeable future.
The scale of a teaching law faculty and the number of senior
researchers required for a major research program in any subject are
quite different. A law school faculty is constructed with the demographic profile of Noah’s Ark, assemble two (or at most three)
experts in every one of the wide range of subject specialties and you
have a faculty of 40, but you don’t have any clusters of specialists
that could be the nucleus of a large research program.
One could of course have non-faculty research specialists as permanent staff in a law school, but in the status hierarchy of the modern law school, the non-faculty fellow is either young and in transition to faculty status or a permanent second-class citizen. Without
very large external funding and the equivalent of long term research
endowments, the upper limits on the scale of empirical research are
pretty strict. There is a glass ceiling to the size of the research enterprise, and it is disturbingly close to the floor.
The only way to gather a critical mass of research scholars in one
school for a jury-project-size endeavor would be to center the
research activities of many professors who teach at different schools
in one central research site (Zimring 1985). Even then, big projects
are quite difficult to mount.
Even relatively small scale data gathering is expensive and takes
a long time. In every university department, it is much easier to build
regression models with available secondary data and crunch numbers
than to create data through surveys, through experiments, or through
systematic observations of historical records or contemporary events.
Further, the social science and humanity departments of research universities are better organized than law schools to support many
empirical research efforts of large scale. Is there any reason, then, to
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have an empirical research capacity located in the law schools of our
major research universities?
Yes there is. The important reason why the research university
needs a law school with empirical research capacity is that many
research projects require a mix of legal sophistication and empirical
research skills. The criminal jury study is Exhibit A on this issue. The
judge versus jury comparison proceeds to the heart of the matter, the
distinctive functions and values of this nonprofessional group in the
criminal trial. The American Jury by Kalven and Zeisel is legal
research in every detail, the kind of work that cannot be done in a
sociology department.
Let me give two further examples from my own Chicago adventures in fact research. Thirty-five years ago, I launched a study of the
influence of weapon dangerousness on the death rate from assault
when I came across the major sociological book on homicide asserting that the dangerousness of a weapon should not matter much
because so many weapons will kill if the attacker really desires his
victim’s death (Wolfgang 1958). That argument seemed to me a
rather heroic assumption to make about homicide because the sociological study had only been examining cases where the victim died.
But I also knew that the criminal law standard for malice in murder
was quite far below requiring the intent to kill, and instead required
only the intention to risk great bodily harm. With that kind of mens
rea standard, there might well be an extraordinary overlap between
attacks that kill and those that do not, in which case the dangerousness of the weapon used could have a large impact on the death rate.
That turned out to be the case (Zimring 1968).
A second University of Chicago adventure involved a program
that diverted defendants from the early stages of the criminal process
into job training and placement efforts. If the defendant was not rearrested, the charges were dropped. The people who designed the program assumed that it was an alternative to a criminal record and punishment, but system insiders know that non-serious criminal charges
often produce neither convictions nor punishments. So we tracked
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the cases carefully and found out that, for most of the defendants, the
program they entered was a larger involvement with the social control system that would have happened if their cases had run the standard route through the system (Zimring 1974).
These case studies are examples of the comparative advantages
that the legal scholar brings to empirical research—knowledge of
legal process and expertise in the substance of law. This is what
makes the legal historian instead of the historian, the legal scholar
doing survey research instead of the survey sociologist, and the legal
scholar studying deterrent effect (Zimring, Hawkins, and Kamin
2001) into the kind of expert who can ask the right questions and
structure the collection of data so that they provide clear answers.
This worldly knowledge of the law professor helps shape empirical research in two important ways. The legal expert can ask the
right questions more often than the non-expert, the question that is
most important in theory, and most important in practice. This is of
critical importance because there is no organized market for legal
research that determines questions to investigate or methods to pursue answers. So much that becomes the subject of scholarship, both
empirical and theoretical, is idiosyncratic to the tastes and interests of
the principle investigator. If Ronald Coase had not left England,
nobody would ever have done his studies of payola in the record
industry. If Richard Posner hadn’t entered the academy, who would
have written Sex and Reason? The selection of topics for legal
research—empirical or not—is a product of a supply-side process
rather close to anarchy. The law professor can serve as a good judge
of both the relevance and materiality of questions for empirical
research.
And that same legal sophistication can inform the methods of
empirical research. Here again, The American Jury is a stunning
example of the right method for the question. The marginal importance of the jury is best approached by comparing outcomes produced by that body with those that would have been delivered by the
alternative fact finder provided in the legal system: a judge. Once that
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thought experiment is in mind, the questionnaire to judges who happened to preside over trials with juries is a natural and almost
inevitable research strategy.
So the good news is that the need for empirical research in legal
scholarship is alive and well. The bad news is that the scale of the
research enterprise is severely constrained by the small number of
specialists of any kind, and the other economic limits of the modern
law school. The American law school is an unlikely host to any nonteaching research professor.
So where are the trained empiricists to be found? Increasingly,
this question is answered by the broad interdisciplinary training of
the modern professor of law. Turn the law faculty upside-down at a
modern research university, and more than a handful of professors
turn out to have extensive training in history, economics, sociology
and other disciplines that have fact gathering traditions. But these law
professors are legal scholars as well, with the exposure and training
to ask the right questions and often also the ability to design appropriate tests for the critical questions they have posed. In seeking the
jointly trained lawyer with capacities for empirical research, we are
turning to the combination of attributes that made Hans Zeisel indispensable to the jury project. The empirical scholar with a law degree
is no longer a deviant case in the modern law faculty.
And there are a host of questions that provoke empirical study.
Are juries where all opponents of the death penalty have been
removed more likely to vote for the prosecution? Do the intestate
succession rules currently used reflect the distributional wishes of
most adults? Did the liberalization of abortion rules contribute to the
crime reductions that were a major development in the 1990s? Do
laws requiring the safe storage of handguns increase crime rates in
states that pass them? Does a joint custody status increase the participation of a father in the lives of his children? These are all the
province of modern law-school-based research. Some of the published research is terrific; some of it is terrible. But it is all within the
extremely wide mainstream of 21st century research in the legal
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academy. To paraphrase Grant Gilmore, we are all empiricists now
(Gilmore 1979).

*

*

*

The jury project was the first great success in empirical research at a
law school, but what was its long-term influence on the life and perspective of the Chicago Law School? Certainly it has not had the
impact on research that the law and economics paradigm has produced at Chicago or elsewhere, because empirical findings often do
not generalize nor do they have pervasive implications for the choice
of legal rules. Indeed, belief in empirical research is not really much
of an ideology. While empiricism may have once served some of its
proponents as a passionate rebuttal to the law library’s monopoly
dominance of legal research, there is no novelty now in the notion
that factual evidence is relevant to legal policy choices. Empiricism
is too contingent and too eclectic to serve as an inspiration for partisan academic crusades.
But the values and insights of exemplary empirical research have
influenced the generations that grew up in proximity to the jury project. My friend and classmate, John Henry Schlegel, J.D. 1967 at the
University of Chicago, wrote a pessimistic history of empirical
research in the legal academy that was published a decade ago
(Schlegel 1993). I wonder whether his interest in the topic wasn’t
kindled by his being a law student at Chicago when The American
Jury was published? If so, his book is circumstantial evidence against
its conclusion.
In my time at Chicago, the jury volume was a subtle but important influence on the school’s self image. Three such different enterprises as The Jury Project, the Center for Studies in Criminal Justice
(founded in 1965), and the Journal of Legal Studies (founded in
1972) helped each other and also benefitted from many common
influences at the Law School. The Chicago perspective of what constituted legal research was broad and varied in 1966, and that is one
reason why the range of approved research is broad today every-
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where. All of these precedents have also become elements of the
research image that young scholars carry away from the school even
now, and at many other schools. The jury project provided a broadening of the definition of legal scholarship for many of those who
took their training on law here in the shadow of the jury project.
A Bibliographic Icon
But the influence of The American Jury has been broader than as an
example of empirical research. One cannot discuss the question of
the impact of the jury project on this school without addressing the
fundamental difference between the Chicago Law School and other
schools. The distinctive feature of the Chicago Law School for the
last half-century has been its fanatic dedication to the importance of
scholarship in the life of a law school. The uneasy role of law schools
(and some other professional schools) in research universities was the
result of the restricted nature of legal research as well as ambivalence
about the importance of scholarship in the professional school. Not at
Chicago.
And the commitment to scholarship at Chicago was in no sense a
matter of one style of inquiry having hegemony. The religion of the
Chicago Law School is scholarship, and excellence in one form of
scholarship is complementary to excellence in other forms. The collective commitment to the next book and the next article is what
every visitor notices in Hyde Park and what every Chicago veteran
misses at other schools. From this perspective, Richard Epstein and
Cass Sunstein are not two sides of the same coin, they are the same
side of the same coin, united by the enormous energy they invest in
scholarship and in the belief that produces such energy, the belief that
ideas and arguments and data matter.
The American Jury functions as an iconic book in the one law
school on the planet most clearly identified with the supremacy of
scholarship. This commitment to scholarship was one reason the
book was finished. Its completion added to the growing identity of
Chicago as an institution that draws its energy from the ambition to
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produce great work. The jury project was both the product of the
University of Chicago as a biblio-centric law school and one of its
greatest inspirations. The American Jury became the most prominent
single achievement of Chicago’s great faith in the proposition that
research matters. At the end of the day, that faith is the genius of the
place.

22

qÜÉ j~ìêáÅÉ ~åÇ jìêáÉä cìäíçå iÉÅíìêÉ pÉêáÉë

References
Arlen, Jennifer. Empirical and Experimental Studies, Social Science
Research Network.
Diamond, Shari Seidman, Neil Vidmar, Mary Rose, Leslie Ellis,
and Beth Murphy. 2003. “Juror Discussions During Civil Trials:
Studying an Arizona Innovation,” 45 Arizona Law Review 1.
Ellsworth, Frank. 1977. Law on the Midway: The Founding of the
University of Chicago Law School. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
Ellsworth, Phoebe. 1988. “Unpleasant Facts: The Supreme Court’s
Response to Empirical Research on Capital Punishment,” in K.C.
Haas and J.A. Inciardi, eds., Adudicating Death: Moral and Legal
Perspectives on Capital Punishment. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage
Publications.
Friendly, Henry. 1966. “Book Review: The American Jury,” 33 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 883.
Gilmore, Grant. 1979. The Ages of American Law. New Haven:
Yale University Press.
Kalven, Harry, Jr., and Hans Zeisel. 1966. The American Jury.
Boston: Little, Brown and Company.
Katz, Jay. 1972. Experimentation with Human Beings: The
Authority of the Investigator, Subject, Professions, and State in the
Human Experimentation Process. New York: Russell Sage
Foundation.

qÜÉ ^ãÉêáÅ~å gìêó mêçàÉÅí ~åÇ íÜÉ `ÜáÅ~Öç i~ï pÅÜççä

23

Levi, Edward. 1951, 1953, 1954, 1958. Proposal to the Ford
Foundation (1951) and Reports to the Ford Foundation. Obtained
from the University of Chicago by John Henry Schlegel.
Meltzer, Bernard. 1953. “A Projected Study of the Jury as a
Working Institution,” 287 Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science 97.
Schlegel, John Henry. 1993. American Legal Realism and
Empirical Social Science. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press.
Simon, Rita James. 1967. The Jury and the Defense of Insanity.
Boston: Little, Brown.
Wolfgang, Marvin. 1958. Patterns in Criminal Homicide.
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Zeisel, Hans. 1973. Six Man Juries and Majority Verdicts: What
Difference Do They Make? Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Zimring, Franklin E., Gordon Hawkins and Sam Kamin. 2001.
Punishment and Democracy: Three Strikes and You’re Out in
California. New York: Oxford University Press.
Zimring, Franklin E. 1968. “Is Gun Control Likely to Reduce
Violent Killings?” 35 University of Chicago Law Review 721.
_______________. 1974. “Measuring the Impact of Pretrial
Diversion from the Criminal Justice System,” 41 University of
Chicago Law Review 224.
_______________. 1985. Program Plan, Earl Warren Legal
Institute, University of California, Berkeley.

